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Schmidt et al. J Surveill Secur Saf 2020;1:1-15 I http://dx.doi.org/10.20517/jsss.2019.02 Page 13

There are two main perceived criticisms of our proposed approach. The first relates to the limited value
added, whereas the latter is concerned with assumption of simplicity of cause and effect. Thus, the first
point is about the true added value of using FTA and RBD, which is claimed to be limited, as these tools did
not discover new lessons. In response to this criticism, one can say that FTA helps to organise relationships
between factors and such mental model in the form of a diagram might be easy to recall and hence
saves much time in going through the large number of pages that is typical of any incident investigation
report. Regarding the second point, of being constrained by a strict cause and effect relationship that may
not capture complexity of the incident, one can argue that such limitation is in a way a blessing, as, by
following such logical way of thinking that is strictly relying on just a couple of logic gates, this approach
provides a rational way of thinking to reach logical conclusions. It is not the intention of this paper to offer
new insight into these tragic cases but instead to present approaches that will help to develop and support
organisational learning, highlighting the diversity of cases for application of the approach and, crucially,
offering a simplified method to capture key information rather than extended narrative, which can dilute
learning for organisations.

In conclusion, the results of integrating the information obtained through the methods of FTA and RBD
can support the various stakeholders of the events to appropriately allocate their resources, improve
processes in terms of standard operating procedures and routines and thereby mitigate future disasters.
Thus, organisational learning is stimulated and organisational resilience can be improved. Again, we stress
here that learning implies change of behaviour to avert similar incidents from occurring and accordingly
unlearning implies abandoning such practices. However, the learning process varied between both cases
due to having investigations closed and failures detected in the case of the Virginia Tech Shooting and
ongoing investigations in the case of the Lion Air 610 crash.

Thus, can the analysis be the motivation for organisational learning? If we define organisational “learning”
from failures as consisting of three main streams: (1) feedback from users to design; (2) use of advanced
modelling and analysis tools; and (3) incorporation of multidisciplinary and generic lessons, as proposed
[10]
by Labib , then, using this lens, the answer is yes. Both cases showed that there is potential to learn
from the disasters as: (1) users’ feedback to design through specific lessons and actions identified; (2) the
integration of failure analysis tools such as FTA and RBD; and (3) the generic lessons learned have been
applied in both safety and security domains.

DECLARATIONS
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge the feedback comments received by the reviewers.

Authors’ contributions
Conceptualisation, data analysis, formal analysis and writing: Schmidt B
Advise on investigation, methodology and supervision: Labib A
Validation, visualisation, review and editing: Hadleigh-Dunn S

Availability of data and materials
Not applicable.

Financial support and sponsorship
None.

Conflicts of interest
All authors declared that there are no conflicts of interest.