The scarcity of social resources limits people's ability to act according to their own will. In such an environment, individuals will feel that their lives and behaviors are out of their control. This reflects a diminished sense of control. Eom et al.^[22] argue that individuals with lower socioeconomic status (SES) tend to experience a chronic lack of perceived control over their life outcomes, stemming from long-term exposure to resource scarcity and survival pressures^[23]. This diminished sense of control fosters the belief that "individual actions are unlikely to change the environment", thereby undermining motivation for pro-environmental behavior. According to Eom et al.^[22], the sense of control, also known as perceived control, is a critical psychological precondition for translating environmental beliefs into actions. Among individuals with high SES, climate change beliefs are strongly and positively correlated with support for environmental protection actions. In contrast, among individuals with low SES, the same beliefs are much less likely to lead to action, precisely because of their insufficient level of perceived control. Eom et al.^[22] also provide experimental evidence that enhancing perceived control among low-SES individuals can strengthen their engagement in pro-environmental behavior. Their experiments showed that when individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds were primed to feel greater agency over their lives, the alignment between their climate change awareness and actual environmental behaviors improved significantly. Vlasceanu et al.^[24] also discovered in a large-scale experiment that by enhancing individuals' self-efficacy and perceived control, their intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviors could be significantly improved. These findings highlight the pivotal role of perceived control as a psychological resource, empowering marginalized groups to act on their environmental concerns and breaking the cycle of apathy and inaction.

This lack of control can also change how low-SES individuals make decisions. Instead of acting on personal convictions, they are more likely to rely on descriptive social norms when deciding whether to support environmental initiatives^[22]. In practice, this can look like an "I will act only if others have already acted" logic. Similarly, Kotyza et al. 's^[25] cross-national study also indicates that perceived behavioral control is one of the key factors in predicting pro-environmental intentions, and its effect even surpasses that of social norms. This dynamic creates a psychological vicious cycle, where feelings of powerlessness suppress motivation, which in turn leads to fewer observable actions among peers. As low-SES individuals see little pro-environmental engagement in their social environment, their reliance on social norms further entrenches their indifference. This cycle of inaction suggests that climate apathy among low-income groups is not merely a product of ignorance or disinterest but is deeply rooted in structural inequalities that erode both individual and collective initiative. Moreover, such apathy exacerbates the material disadvantages already faced by these groups, further widening the gap in climate policy support across income levels.

Recent studies strengthen this view by introducing climate apathy as a critical psychological mediator^[7]. Climate apathy refers to an individual's attitude towards climate change. Specifically, climate apathy means that the individual lacks knowledge about climate change, has a low level of understanding of it, and even shows a skeptical attitude towards it^[7]. Tian et al.^[7] found that climate apathy explains 38.29% of the effect of income poverty on climate policy support, whereas economic burden explains only 8%. Importantly, low-income individuals often perceive climate change as temporally and spatially distant, reducing their sense of urgency and perceived personal relevance. This "distance-induced apathy" leads to weaker engagement, even when financial incentives exist^[7]. Complementary evidence comes from survey studies in China. Tian et al.^[5] demonstrated that climate change perception and environmental topic involvement are significant predictors of support for consumption-side climate policies, such as carbon taxes and renewable energy promotion. Bröhmer^[26]'s research further supports this conclusion, emphasizing that if individuals are unable to perceive their control over future environmental outcomes, climate behavioral intentions will be difficult to arise. Yet, these effects are moderated by income: low-income individuals with weaker climate risk perception and less topic involvement showed systematically lower policy support^[5]. Similarly, Al Mamun et al.^[27] found that among low-income households in Malaysia, eco-literacy and self-efficacy strongly shape attitudes toward green consumption, and that low perceived behavioral control acts as a barrier to translating pro-environmental attitudes into actual behavior.

Policy trust is a key factor shaping public acceptance and support for environmental policies. It is the citizens' belief that the government will design and implement policies with competence and integrity, in pursuit of the broader public interest^[28]. Specifically, public trust in the government's capacity to implement policy and the willingness to distribute policy benefits fairly directly affect the degree of support for the policies^[29]. This trust is not only based on the current performance of the government's capabilities, but is also deeply influenced by the trust in the social structure, the perception of corruption, and historical experiences of discrimination and unfair treatment. Pearson et al.^[29] argue that the extent to which the public regards climate change as a moral and just issue is constantly rising globally. However, whether this sense of justice and willingness to cooperate can be transformed into policy support largely depends on the public's perception of whether the policy implementation process is fair and inclusive of low-income groups. The perception of distributive justice and procedural justice has been proven to be a significant predictor of support for a wide range of policy measures, including carbon pricing policies.

This conclusion echoes the review by Drews and Van Den Bergh^[4], who hold that the public's perception of the "fairness" and "effectiveness" of policies is a key factor influencing climate policy support. This perception is deeply influenced by people's level of trust in the fairness of the government. In the horizontal comparison among different countries, the international survey data of Dechezleprêtre et al.^[8] also found that the public's acceptance of climate policies such as carbon taxes and green investment is highly correlated with their trust in whether the government can effectively reduce inequality, rationally use income, and promote emission reduction. Similarly, cross-national comparative studies also indicate that trust in government effectiveness plays a mediating role between climate concerns and policy support. People may acknowledge climate risks, but if they doubt the fairness of the country's implementation, it is difficult for them to convert their concerns into support^[30]. Experimental studies also show that trust affects the public's response to the policy framework. When people are convinced that climate policies will be implemented in an honest and fair manner, they are more likely to express support^[31]. When the public is skeptical about the government's "distributive fairness" and "executive capacity", even if they are aware of the severity of climate change, it is difficult for them to translate this into concrete policy support.

Moreover, an experiment found that when policies clearly state that the interests of low-income groups will be given priority (such as exemptions for low-income families), public support significantly increases^[6]. However, when policies seem to only protect the interests of industrial enterprises, their support rate decreases. This indicates that the public not only pays attention to the policy goals themselves, but also assesses whether the government has the ability to fairly distribute the costs and benefits of policies.

In addition, social trust and perceived corruption are also important factors influencing policy trust. Majumdar and Weber^[32] argue that from a psychological perspective, the experiences of low-income groups being marginalized or suffering injustice in history will intensify their suspicion of the existing system, thereby reducing their support for new policies. Consistent with this, the latest experimental research indicates that the public's acceptance of carbon taxes is crucially dependent on whether they trust the fairness of the government's distribution^[33].

Public support for climate policies is strongly shaped by perceptions of fairness in policy design, with systematic variations across income groups. Evidence indicates that policy features often more than general climate attitudes are decisive in shaping approval^[8]. Low-income groups tend to prioritize inequality reduction and protections for vulnerable populations, while high-income groups focus on policy efficiency and personal cost burdens^[6]. For instance, policies exempting low-income households from climate costs garner broader support than those shielding industries. Objective evidence shows that carbon emissions are highly concentrated among high-income groups, which makes distributional responsibility a central fairness consideration in climate policy debates^[34]. This concentration is also visible in consumption-based footprints and remains salient when development and poverty-alleviation dynamics are taken into account^[35]. Because this objective baseline implies large emission disparities, public beliefs about "who emits how much" become pivotal for whether progressive policy designs are perceived as fair^[36]. Cross-national research conducted in Denmark, India, Nigeria, and the United States shows that many respondents significantly underestimate the emissions of high-income groups, especially those of the top 10% and top 1%, leading to the misperception that carbon footprint inequality is limited. This cognitive bias reduces support for class-based carbon taxes, as they are deemed "unfair", a view especially prevalent among high-income groups who rationalize emission inequalities as legitimate^[10]. Notably, even when empirical data on emission disparities are disclosed, this bias persists and remains negatively correlated with policy support^[10].

However, the income-support relationship is nonlinear. High-income respondents exhibit divergent stances, with some accepting higher costs for environmental gains and others resisting redistributive measures perceived as unfairly penalizing wealthier individuals^[8]. This underscores that even amid widespread environmental concern, support ultimately depends on whether policies are viewed as equitably balanced rather than disproportionately targeting specific groups.

When evaluating climate policies, there are fundamental differences in the views of low-income and high-income groups on fairness and priorities, which in turn affect their level of support. For low-income groups, they pay more attention to equality in policy outcomes and tend to support exemption and subsidy policies that can reduce overall inequality and directly ease their financial pressure^[6]. In their view, if a policy can clearly reduce their economic burden and is regarded as fair, it will significantly enhance their willingness to support the policy. Even if the policy also offers a certain degree of exemption to other groups, such as the industrial sector, as long as low-income families themselves receive substantial assistance, their support rate will still increase^[6]. Overall, the attitudes of low-income groups are largely dominated by economic pressure. They often view direct monetary costs like carbon taxes as a heavy burden, especially since this cost structure usually shows a regressive nature, making the relative proportion borne by low-income individuals higher. Therefore, they are more likely to oppose such policies^[8].

By contrast, high-income groups place greater emphasis on procedural fairness and tend to believe that costs should be borne proportionally to an individual's income level or carbon emission level. They usually oppose policies that have a clear tendency towards redistribution and are aimed at prioritizing the assistance of low-income groups, because such designs, in their view, deviate from the principle of "fairness" and may even infringe upon their own interests^[6]. This resistance is further reinforced by their systematic underestimation of carbon emission inequality. High-income individuals often perceive current emission distributions as "reasonable", partly because they rationalize their own disproportionate environmental impact^[10]. Furthermore, high-income groups often lack an accurate understanding of the degree of inequality in carbon emissions and environmental impact among different income brackets. They generally underestimate the contribution of high-income individuals to carbon emissions and tend to believe that the current income distribution and environmental burden are already "reasonable" or "fair"^[10]. This attitude partly stems from their mentality of maintaining the existing social order, that is, to protect their vested interests by rationalizing the status quo. At the same time, it reflects a broader psychological defense of their position in debates over climate responsibility. They place more emphasis on the efficiency and cost control of policies, and are more likely to support policies that use climate taxes to invest in green infrastructure or reduce the overall tax burden^[10]. However, they show a strong resistance to redistributive schemes that directly transfer payments to low-income groups. This tendency indicates that high-income groups support climate policies more based on considerations of efficiency and consistency of rules rather than concerns about mitigating social inequality.

However, the attitudes of high-income groups toward climate policies exhibit significant internal divisions. On one hand, some affluent individuals are willing to bear higher costs for environmental protection, as evidenced by their support for progressive carbon taxes with revenue earmarked for green investments or cash transfers to low-income groups^[8]. This group prioritizes the perceived effectiveness of policies in reducing emissions and acknowledges the broader societal benefits of climate action. On the other hand, another segment of high-income groups opposes policies perceived as "punishing the wealthy", particularly those involving redistributive mechanisms. For instance, carbon taxes with equal cash transfers or reductions in corporate taxes garner less support among this subgroup, as they are viewed as disproportionately targeting capital owners^[8]. Similarly, Han and Xu^[37] suggest that market-based environmental regulations can shift compliance costs across groups. In China's 2018 environmental tax reform, they argue that capital owners may pass part of the burden onto workers through lower wages. This pattern is consistent with resistance when policies are perceived to threaten high-income groups' economic interests. This divergence underscores the nuanced interplay between self-interest, perceived fairness, and policy design in shaping high-income individuals' climate policy preferences.

As mentioned above, regarding the psychological aspect of high-income and low-income groups, low-income groups prefer compensatory fairness. Low-income groups advocate that carbon tax revenue should be targeted to compensate for their own losses rather than being evenly distributed. High-income groups emphasize formal equality and believe that costs should be shared proportionally. This stance is related to their self-interest motivation. When policy design leans towards redistribution, high-income groups oppose it because they have to bear more costs. Accordingly, perceived fairness in policy design is a key factor shaping climate policy support across income groups.

In the context of climate policy design, Konc et al.^[9] identify an inequality paradox, whereby rising income inequality simultaneously strengthens the rationale for progressive, redistributive climate policies while also intensifying resistance from high-income groups. On the one hand, greater inequality means a larger share of the population is economically vulnerable, increasing both the demand for and the legitimacy of policies that compensate low-income groups and impose proportionally higher costs on high emitters. On the other hand, high-income groups who are more influential in shaping public discourse through social networks tend to resist such policies to protect their economic interests. Their opposition can dampen overall public support, especially when their narratives frame progressive policies as unfair or economically harmful. This paradox highlights the challenge of balancing distributive justice and political feasibility in climate policy design.

Empirical findings from Dechezleprêtre et al.^[8] and Andor et al.^[6] further illustrate how policy fairness design shapes preferences. For example, low-income respondents display stronger support for revenue-recycling schemes that prioritize compensating low-income groups, while high-income respondents prefer equal per-capita rebates or infrastructure investments, which they view as more procedurally fair and economically efficient. In addition, high-income groups tend to underestimate their disproportionate contribution to carbon emissions and environmental burdens, and oppose redistribution policies that are perceived as "penalizing wealth" on the grounds of maintaining the status quo^[10].

Furthermore, Nielsen et al.^[10] propose that high-income groups often underestimate their contribution to carbon emissions and environmental burdens and tend to believe that current inequality is reasonable. This psychological defense mechanism may form a structural resistance to redistribution policies at higher income levels. Therefore, in policy design, merely achieving "fairness" through economic models is not enough. It is also necessary to guide public opinion and communicate information based on the differences in fairness perception among different groups, reduce the distrust of high-income groups towards policies, and enhance the trust of low-income groups in the fairness of policies.

Research on public support for climate policies indicates that support for climate policies depends not only on policy design and economic consequences but also on the dynamics of public opinion^[9]. Specifically, the dominant position of high-income groups in social networks and public discourse gives them greater influence in shaping public opinion on climate policies, and they may thus dominate or even reverse the direction of policies.

The model proposed by Konc et al.^[9] indicates that public support for climate policies is not only determined by individual utility and perception of equity, but is also significantly influenced by the dynamics of opinions within their social networks. High-income individuals are usually more capable of expressing their opinions on social networks and in public places, and their viewpoints are also more likely to be spread and influence others. Therefore, when high-income groups collectively express dissatisfaction with a certain policy, such negative attitudes often spread through social influence mechanisms, leading to a decline in the original support level of low-income groups. This phenomenon is known as "public opinion dominance bias", which reflects the distorting effect of the dominant position of high-income groups in the public opinion field on policy acceptance.

Similar psychological mechanisms are also reflected in the psychological basis of climate justice discussed by Majumdar and Weber^[32]. Research indicates that when dominant groups are confronted with policies that are detrimental to their own interests, they often resist changes by strengthening their collective identity and reinforcing the moral boundaries within the group, and utilize their stronger social influence to shape a "fairness" narrative, thereby influencing the policy-making process.

Furthermore, social norms and group identity significantly shape climate policy support among low-income groups^[22]. Low-income groups are more inclined to rely on social norms for decision-making, while high-income groups place greater emphasis on personal beliefs and perceived control. When high-income groups form a public opinion atmosphere of unanimous opposition to a certain policy through social networks, such norms can exert pressure on low-income groups, causing their original attitude of supporting the policy based on personal interests to change, thereby weakening overall policy support.

From the perspective of communication media, social media has become an important channel for the formation of public environmental attitudes. Wagdi et al.^[38] found through empirical research on emerging countries that social media activities can significantly change consumers' willingness to engage in green consumption, but at the same time, they are also easily dominated by opinion leaders, thereby amplifying the voices of certain groups.

Policy transparency is a crucial determinant of whether low-income groups support climate policies. Dechezleprêtre et al.^[8] show through cross-national experiments that when policies are accompanied by clear explanations of rebate mechanisms and the distribution of benefits across income groups, support for carbon taxes and green infrastructure investment increases significantly among low-income individuals. By contrast, relying solely on climate crisis narratives has a much weaker effect on support. This suggests that for individuals facing daily economic pressures, abstract climate risk information is less persuasive than policy explanations that highlight tangible benefits. Tian et al.^[7] further reveal the psychological mechanism underlying this effect. They find that when low-income individuals are provided with transparent and comprehensible information, their climate apathy decreases substantially, and the resistance caused by a lack of perceived control is mitigated. Carattini et al.^[39] also demonstrate that providing clear, salient information about the use of carbon tax revenues, especially when earmarked for environmental purposes or rebates, significantly raises public support for climate policies. Moreover, Klenert et al.^[40] emphasize that transparency and communication about redistribution are critical for making carbon pricing politically feasible, particularly to gain support from low-income groups. Thus, transparency not only improves information accessibility but also addresses psychological barriers between income groups, reducing disparities in policy support.

The design of carbon tax rebate schemes directly shapes the level of acceptance across income groups. Andor et al.^[6] find that high-income groups tend to prefer universal lump-sum rebates, regarding equal distribution as a fair outcome, while low-income groups favor targeted compensation, which they perceive as more equitable because it prioritizes support for vulnerable households. These divergent conceptions of fairness lead to markedly different attitudes toward the same policy design. As Baranzini et al.^[41] note, revenue recycling is a central determinant of the political feasibility of carbon pricing, and transparent, equitable return mechanisms are critical for sustaining public support. Moreover, the visibility of the rebate mechanism is a decisive factor. Konc et al.^[9] demonstrate that high-visibility measures such as direct cash transfers or deductions on utility bills significantly increase trust and support among low-income groups, whereas indirect subsidies channeled through energy companies often fail to generate the same perception of benefit. Consistent with this, Beiser-McGrath and Bernauer^[2] show through survey experiments that public support for carbon taxes varies dramatically depending on how revenues are recycled, with direct transfers and earmarked green spending eliciting much higher acceptance than undifferentiated tax cuts. This indicates that rebate mechanisms are not merely economic redistribution tools but also critical instruments that shape fairness perceptions and institutional trust.

Beyond transparency and rebate schemes, the types of policies themselves can trigger distinct reactions across income groups. Dechezleprêtre et al.^[8], in a 20-country study, show that public support hinges on three criteria: policy effectiveness, distributional fairness, and personal economic impact. Low-income groups generally oppose uncompensated carbon taxes because of their regressive nature, as energy expenditures constitute a larger share of their household budgets^[42]. However, when carbon tax revenues are redistributed as cash transfers to low-income households, support increases significantly; an experimental study in Sweden found that compensatory measures improve perceptions of fairness and policy acceptability^[43]. Similarly, Jagers et al.^[44], in survey experiments conducted in the United States, Canada, and Germany, found that income rebate mechanisms increase public support for carbon taxes by enhancing perceptions of fairness. Furthermore, acceptance is highest when revenues are used for mixed purposes, simultaneously funding environmental projects such as renewable energy and providing compensation to low-income groups^[45]. By contrast, carbon taxes without earmarked revenues or heavy agricultural levies are often opposed for being unfair or overly burdensome. Overall, these findings indicate that acceptance depends not only on environmental goals but also on how policy design allocates costs and benefits across social groups.

In addition to the substantive content of policy design, asymmetries in information dissemination significantly shape disparities in support across income groups. Konc et al.^[9] emphasize that high-SES groups dominate public discourse in both mainstream and social media, and their opposition to certain policies is often amplified, creating a "bandwagon effect" that shifts the attitudes of low-SES individuals, who may align with dominant media narratives rather than their own underlying preferences. Since lower-SES groups rely more heavily on social norms when forming policy preferences, they are particularly vulnerable to such shifts in dominant opinion. This dynamic suggests that even when policies are objectively beneficial to low-SES groups, their support may decline if discourse is monopolized by higher-income voices. Scholars debate whether this persistent knowledge gap between high- and low-SES individuals stems from structural biases in media and social systems or from limitations among less-educated groups themselves^[46]. However, public affairs knowledge is the foundation of social power, and if media systems systematically favor high-SES groups, marginalized communities risk becoming trapped in a cycle of "knowledge isolation" that further constrains their participation in complex policy debates, including those related to climate change^[47].

Finally, the impact of policy design on income groups is highly contingent on institutional and cultural contexts. Drews and Van Den Bergh^[4] find that in democratic settings, preferences for climate policy are strongly shaped by values and class structures, with distributional fairness playing a particularly important role. Pearson et al.^[29] further show that institutional trust and perceptions of procedural fairness exert a stronger influence on policy acceptance in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. Consistent with this, Kitt et al.^[48] demonstrate in a Canadian survey that citizens' acceptance of diverse climate policies is strongly predicted by their trust in government competence, integrity, and value similarity, with competence trust emerging as the most decisive factor across policy types. Meanwhile, Konc et al.^[9] note that high-income groups often retain discourse dominance regardless of regime type. Cultural differences also shape policy acceptance. Eom et al.^[22] demonstrate that in collectivist cultures, low-SES groups are more likely to rely on social norms when deciding whether to support policies, whereas in individualist cultures, personal beliefs play a stronger role. Similarly, Nielsen et al.^[10] show in a four-country experiment that public judgments of carbon responsibility attribution vary significantly across cultural contexts, influencing perceptions of fairness and, in turn, policy support. These findings suggest that the interaction between income differences and policy design cannot be understood in isolation but must be situated within broader institutional and cultural frameworks.